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Patrolling Pregnant Immigrant Detainees’
Bodies
Alexa Rollins†

INTRODUCTION
E heard, “[we are] not a hospital and [we are not] doctors” as she
lay for eight days bleeding out and crying as she miscarried, losing her
son during the fourth month of her pregnancy.1 Emma heard, “No, don’t
tell me anything. You all say the same thing,” as she tried to explain
that she was a pregnant as a result of rape.2 Teresa heard no response
as she complained on several different occasions that she was in pain,
that she was bleeding profusely despite being four months pregnant,
and that she needed to go to a hospital.3
What do E, Emma, and Teresa have in common? They were all
pregnant immigrant detainees confined to United States detention centers who were shackled around their hands, legs, and stomach.
In December 2017, the Trump administration instituted a Department of Homeland Security policy allowing for the detention of pregnant women in their first and second trimesters.4 The new Immigration
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1
Ema O’Connor & Nidhi Prakash, Pregnant Women Say They Miscarried in Immigration
Detention and Didn’t Get the Care They Needed, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://www.buzzf
eednews.com/article/emaoconnor/pregnant-migrant-women-miscarriage-cpb-ice-detention-trump
[https://perma.cc/P8BQ-H7U8].
2
American Civil Liberties Union et al., Re: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Detention and Treatment of Pregnant Women, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 7–8 (2017), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/general_litigation/complaint_increasing
_numbers_of_pregnant_women_facing_harm_in_detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9JP-QPGM].
3
Id. at 8–9.
4
ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/docume
nts/Document/2018/11032_3_PregnantDetaineP.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL3K-5HD4]. See also Victoria López, Working to Uncover How ICE Treats Pregnant Women in Detention, ACLU: AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 3, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrantsrights-and-detention/working-uncover-how-ice-treats-pregnant-women [https://perma.cc/ZL2E-K
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and Customs Enforcement (ICE) directive, which failed to be announced
until March despite its earlier implementation, ended the Obama administration’s August 2016 policy to refrain from detaining pregnant
women whose immigration cases are pending except in extreme circumstances.5 The 2016 policy change was prompted by ICE’s acknowledgement of the larger consensus among humanitarian and medical organizations that shackling and other forms of mistreatment are harmful to
the health of expectant women and that its detention centers are not
prepared to meet their unique medical needs.6 Due to President
Trump’s executive orders on immigration,7 though, this reasonable rationale has been swept aside in favor of incarcerating pregnant women
who have yet to reach their third trimester.8 The ICE directive has also
eliminated reporting procedures that previously allowed outside agencies to monitor ICE’s detention facilities and the treatment of women.9
Furthermore, despite the new policy’s directions not to hold women
in their third trimester and to provide appropriate medical care, pregnant detainees’ testimonies prove that this portion of the directive is
being ignored.10 In fact, pregnant detainees often are not given proper
medical care, are physically and psychologically mistreated, and are
shackled around the stomach.11 The treatment within detention centers
is often re-traumatizing for these women, especially since many of these
women’s pregnancies are a result of sexual assaults.12
Part I of this Comment describes in more detail the physical and
mental suffering inflicted on pregnant detainees during their time in
detention centers. It further discusses the ICE detention standards and
the 2017 ICE directive’s contravention of them. Part II goes on to review
42 U.S.C. § 198313 claims brought forth by past prisoners, alleging vio-

XGN]; Liz Jones, Pregnant and Detained, NPR: NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr.6, 2018), https://ww
w.npr.org/2018/04/05/599802820/pregnant-and-detained [https://perma.cc/9E84-377W]; O’Connor,
supra note 1.
5
ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, U.S IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Document/2016/11032.2_IdentificationMoIdentificationMonitoringP.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L4B-V
F58]. See also Jones, supra note 4; O’Connor, supra note 1.
6
López, supra note 4.
7
See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
8
O’Connor, supra note 1.
9
López, supra note 4.
10
O’Connor, supra note 1.
11
See e.g., id.
12
At least three of the ten women who filed complaints testified to becoming pregnant as a
result of sexual assaults, whether in their home country or on their journey into the United States.
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6–9.
13
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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lations of their Eighth Amendment rights under the deliberate indifference standard. The Comment goes on to recognize that pretrial detainees, though they are non-convicted, have been tried by courts under this
same subjective standard. It points out, though, that a recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson,14 applied an
objective standard to a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims. In
turn, it has led to a circuit split in which the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits interpret this objective standard to extend to all Fourteenth
Amendment claims while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits do
not. Part III then evaluates how international law, through its conventions and cases, has weighed in on the treatment of detainees and, thus,
might affect courts’ decision making.
Due to the broad wording of Kingsley and the similar injuries, both
physical and constitutional, of excessive force and other Fourteenth
Amendment claims, this Comment argues in Part IV that courts should
interpret Kingsley to apply the objective standard to all Fourteenth
Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees. This reading not only
is backed up by the Court’s decision in Kingsley, but also will provide a
more favorable standard for pretrial detainees. Part V further asserts
that international law, especially relevant given that pregnant detainees are foreign nationals, supports this assertion and should be used by
courts as persuasive authority. Finally, Part VI of this Comment responds to counterarguments by contending that current and pending
domestic laws do not apply to or adequately protect pregnant pretrial
detainees.
Given the increasing number of pregnant detainees within U.S. detention centers,15 this inhumane treatment needs to be legally addressed as soon as possible. In fact, the #MeToo Movement demands
that this treatment of pregnant women be stopped and that their rights
and dignity be acknowledged. This Comment concludes, then, that the
best course of action courts can take is to extend the Kingsley decision
to Fourteenth Amendment claims other than excessive force. Especially
in light of the support provided by international law, such an interpretation not only is legally correct but also would provide justice for pregnant immigrant detainees, who should have never been mistreated or
shackled in the first place.

14

135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
By April 2018, 506 pregnant women had already been detained since December’s policy
reversal. Compare this to 292 pregnant women detained between January and May of 2017. Jones,
supra note 4.
15
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AN OVERVIEW OF ICE DETENTION CONDITIONS, STANDARDS, AND
DIRECTIVES

I.
A.

Physical and Mental Harms to Pregnant Detainees

Pregnant detainees, who are often asylum seekers fleeing violence
in their own countries, have shared similar accounts of inadequate medical attention and mistreatment. They report detention officers ignoring
their requests for or delaying medical care, even when they are in severe pain, bleeding out, or miscarrying.16 Detention staff also failed to
refer women with high-risk pregnancies to specialists.17 When women
are given medical attention, their physicians often fail to inquire about
their physical or mental state and to provide them with prenatal vitamins.18 Due to this inadequate health care, pregnant detainees report
having headaches, abdominal pain, weakness, nausea, and vomiting.19
Additionally, women attest that the detention centers are overcrowded, the food makes them nauseous, the mattresses, if any, are
thin, and viruses, such those causing the flu and diarrhea, are rampant.20 Emma, mentioned in the introduction, said that she could not
sleep at the facility due to the crying of the detained children.21
In addition, shackling of pregnant detainees persists despite being
a dangerous practice that poses unacceptable health risks to expectant
mothers and children.22 Restraints can leave deep gashes on expectant
mothers’ ankles, bruise their abdomens, and decrease their stability,
which increases their likelihood of falling, harming themselves or their
child, and miscarrying.23 During labor, shackling prevents physicians
16

American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5. For example, Teresa, mentioned
in the Introduction, eventually miscarried due to lack of medical attention and was later denied
any pain relief medication, causing her to have headaches and dramatically lose weight. Id. at 9.
17
Id.
18
One doctor even failed to give a twenty-four-year-old Honduran her vaccinations; instead,
he gave them to her five-year-old daughter who had already received them. Id. at 7, 12.
19
See, e.g., López, supra note 4. See also Jones, supra note 4 (recounting Jacinta Morales’
similar detention conditions that eventually led to her miscarriage). It should be noted that, aside
from nausea and vomiting, these are not common pregnancy symptoms. Furthermore, these
women reported being nauseous and vomiting after being detained. See What Are Some Common
Signs of Pregnancy?, NICHD: EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2018), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/conditioninfo/signs [https://perma.cc/ZGY6-FQYS].
20
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6, 7, 11.
21
Id. at 8.
22
See O’Connor, supra note 1; Hilary Hammell, The International Human Right to Safe and
Humane Treatment During Pregnancy and a Theory for Its Application in U.S. Courts, 33 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 244, 250 n.49 (2012) (citing a Human Rights Watch report that found pregnant women
in immigration detention are routinely shackled.).
23
See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, Health Care for Pregnant and
Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Commit
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from safely assisting pregnant women, limits women’s critical need to
move during labor, and causes complications such as hemorrhaging and
decreased fetal heart rate.24 It may also delay a woman’s caesarian section, which could cause permanent brain damage to the child.25 Postpartum shackling may prevent women from healing properly and
breast-feeding.26
Pregnant women’s mental health is endangered in detention as
well. The lack of access to health care, the physical harms suffered, the
separation from their families, and the uncertainty of immigration proceedings leave pregnant detainees severely stressed. Indeed, most
women have attested to feeling isolated, depressed, and anxious.27
Many pregnant detainees are also survivors of abuse and are either
fleeing their abuser or are pregnant due to sexual assault.28 They often
find the mistreatment in the detention facilities and the preparation for
a credible fear interview29 with an asylum officer to be re-traumatizing.30 All interviewed pregnant detainees worried that this mental pressure adversely affected their pregnancies; this fear of stress thus causes
pregnant detainees to be more stressed.31 Acute stress during pregnancy, especially in the final trimester, could then lead to preterm
births,32 which often lead to higher rates of child death or disability.33
tee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co511.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20181030T0057284577 [https
://perma.cc/A4SK-XHYM]; The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison
Project, ACLU Briefing Paper: The Shackling of Pregnant Women & Girls in U.S. Prisons, Jails &
Youth Detention Centers, ACLU: AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 3 (2018), https://www.aclu.org
/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDZ-G265].
24
See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014). See also
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4.
25
See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014); see also
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4.
26
See Dana L. Sichel, Giving Birth in Shackles: A Constitutional and Human Rights Violation, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 223, 225 (2007); The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 3 (citing Dr. Patricia Garcia’s statement
to the Chicago Legal Aid to Incarcerated Mothers in December 1998).
27
See American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5–12.
28
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2, 6–9.
29
This is an interview with an asylum officer to establish a credible fear of persecution. American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2.
30
For example, a twenty-eight-year-old from Honduras attested to the traumatic preparation
for her credible fear interview in which she was forced to disclose her history of domestic and
sexual violence in detail. American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6.
31
Id. at 5.
32
This is the testimony of Sera Bonds, founder and CEO of Circle of Health International,
who has cared pregnant women after they have been released from detention centers. Madhuri
Sathish, Pregnant Immigrants Are Being Shackled at the Border & Lawmakers Want to End That
Practice, BUSTLE (July 26, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/pregnant-immigrants-are-being-shack
led-at-the-border-lawmakers-want-to-end-that-practice-9892600 [https://perma.cc/L6RB-HRDY].
33
Disabilities include “breathing problems, feeding difficulties, cerebral palsy, developmental
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ICE Standards and Directives

To deter such harms, medical organizations34 have drafted pregnancy-related care standards to guide prisons and jails. In addition to
condemning the shackling of pregnant women, they recommend thoroughly documenting all pregnancies and the care provided, screening
and counseling women, referring high-risk pregnancies to the appropriate physicians, and providing essential prenatal care.35
ICE adopted the medical organizations’ standards in the 2011 ICE
Performance Based National Detention Standard (PBNDS) on Medical
Care for Women. ICE acknowledges that pregnancy constitutes a special vulnerability and may put detainees at a higher risk for victimization or assault.36 Detention centers must provide prenatal care and
counseling “inclusive of, but not limited to: nutrition, exercise, complications of pregnancy, prenatal vitamins, labor and delivery, postpartum
care, lactation, family planning, abortion services, and parental skills
education.”37 Detention centers must also offer pregnant detainees
“temperature-appropriate” clothing and blankets, beds in their holding
cells, and more food during meals.38 The PBNDS also bars the shackling
of women who are pregnant or recovering post-partum, “‘absent truly
extraordinary circumstances.’”39
Following the PBNDS and recognizing the harms of detaining pregnant women, the Obama administration released a policy in August
2016 barring the detention of pregnant women unless the mandatory
detention statute applied or “extraordinary circumstances” existed.40 If
delay, vision problems, and hearing problems.” Preterm Birth, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pret
ermbirth.htm [https://perma.cc/5VW9-H6A7].
34
These include the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), American
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and American Public Health Association
(APHA).
35
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4 (citing Committee Opinion: Health
Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 2011), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guid
ance-and-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women
/Health-Care-for-Pregnant-and-Postpartum-Incarcerated-Women-and-Adolescent-Females?IsMobileSet=false [https://perma.cc/6JKK-2L9H]).
36
ICE Performance Based Detention Standards, 2.2 Custody Classification System, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (rev. Dec. 2016) 62, 70, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dete
ntion-standards/2011/2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9K-W9Y7].
37
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4. See also ICE Performance Based
Detention Standards, 4.4 Medical Care (Women), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(rev. Dec. 2016) 324–25, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/4-4.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/SYC8-KM6J].
38
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4.
39
Id. (citation omitted).
40
ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5. See
also American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3.
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a pregnant woman was detained, ICE needed to evaluate each week
whether her continued confinement was necessary.41 In spite of this directive, attorneys and other advocates reported in November 2016 that
detention centers and officers continued to detain and shackle pregnant
immigrant women.42
A little over a year later, in December 2017, the Trump administration repealed this directive and gave ICE the power to detain pregnant
women in their first and second trimesters.43 Its policy also removes the
mandated reporting mechanisms through which outside organizations
monitored ICE’s detention centers and treatment of pregnant detainees.44 Given this extension of ICE’s abilities and lack of supervision,
hundreds—and counting—of pregnant immigrant women have continued to be detained, shackled, and subjected to inhumane conditions.45
II. DOMESTIC LAW: THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD VS.
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD
When subjected to repeated abuses and mistreatment, pregnant
immigrant detainees are afforded avenues to bring forth cases against
detention officials, medical staff, detention centers, and the Department of Homeland Security. Historically, pregnant detainees, like convicted prisoners, have brought suits under 42 U.S.C. § 198346 against
state actors, claiming violations of their Eighth Amendment47 rights,
which are extended to pretrial detainees through the Fourteenth
Amendment.48 But a recent Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson,49 suggests that pregnant detainees are entitled to more protection than convicted prisoners and that they should be tried under a
different standard, which has led to a circuit split.

41

ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5.
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3.
43
ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, supra note 4.
See also López, supra note 4.
44
Id.
45
López, supra note 4.
46
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) (providing the cause of action for a claim that “[a] person . . . under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” violated a federally
protected constitutional or statutory right).
47
U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
48
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
49
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
42
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Eighth Amendment Protections Afforded Convicted Pregnant
Prisoners (and Extended to Pregnant Detainees)

Given that courts have historically viewed pregnant detainees’
cases under the same standard as those of pregnant prisoners, it is
worthwhile to explore the history and merits of those cases. This history
begins with Estelle v. Gamble.50
In Estelle, the Supreme Court acknowledged prisoners’ right to receive adequate medical treatment. The Court held that prison officials’
deliberate indifference to incarcerated persons’ serious medical needs
constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and thus
violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.51 Indeed, denying prisoners medical care could cause them
pain and suffering that does not serve a legitimate penological purpose.52 Furthermore, the Court found that prison guards’ intentional
denial or delay of prisoners’ access to medical care constitutes deliberate indifference.53 Thus, the Court in Estelle created the deliberate indifference standard, a subjective standard requiring plaintiffs to show
that the defendant intended harm and actually believed harm would
likely occur.54
By 1994, the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan55 established
that two elements must be satisfied to establish that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs must show that defendants: (1)
exposed them to a substantial risk of serious harm56 and (2) were deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights.57 The Court acknowledged that deliberate indifference was a vague phrase and attempted
to clarify it as a standard of reckless disregard, though it acknowledged
that this explanation was equally vague.58 By this time, the Court had

50

429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 104–05 (citing to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
52
Id. at 103.
53
Id. at 104.
54
See, e.g., Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014).
55
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
56
Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
57
Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03). See also Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating the two necessary elements).
58
Id. at 836–37 (concluding that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference).
51
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also extended the deliberate indifference standard to other types of
claims such as failure-to-protect59 and conditions of confinement.60
Pretrial detainees, though, have different standing than prisoners.
Detainees, unlike sentenced inmates, have yet to be tried for their
crimes.61 Given this lack of adjudication of guilt, courts must scrutinize
pretrial detainees’ claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.62 Whereas the Eighth
Amendment allows for the punishment of sentenced prisoners so long
as it is not cruel and unusual, the Due Process Clause mandates that
pretrial detainees not be punished.63
Despite this acknowledged difference, courts have usually examined the claims of pretrial detainees under the Eighth Amendment’s
standards. This is due to the Supreme Court’s vague explanation of
what deprivations the state can subject pretrial detainees to short of
punishment. Indeed, the Court in Bell v. Wolfish64 stated that, while a
detainee does not have a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from discomfort, a condition or restriction
of pretrial detention must be “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.”65 Given this ambiguous and broad definition,
courts have relied on the Court’s repeated assertion that pretrial detainees’ due process rights “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner”66 to extend Eighth
Amendment scrutiny to pretrial detainees’ claims.
Under these Eighth Amendment standards, both pregnant prisoners and pregnant detainees have brought § 1983 claims alleging deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. Circuits, though, have
interpreted the deliberate indifference standard differently.

59

Id. at 837.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303.
61
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).
62
Id. at 535, 535 n.16.
63
Id. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946)
(“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned
until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
64
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) and
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
65
Id. at 539.
66
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
60
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The Second, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits have found inadequate medical care and shackling to meet the deliberate indifference standard

The Second Circuit heard the case of a pregnant prisoner who
claimed that county jail officials intentionally delayed her medical care
when she suffered severe pain and subsequently miscarried.67 Despite
disagreements on the plaintiff’s health status and timing of emergency
medical care, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]hese assertions, however disputed, do raise material factual issues.68 After all, if the defendants did decide to delay emergency medical aid—even for ‘only’ five
hours—in order to make Archer suffer, surely a claim would be stated
under Estelle.”69
The Eighth Circuit has also found ignoring pregnant prisoners’
bleeding constitutes deliberate indifference and violates their right to
medical care. In Boswell v. Sherburne,70 a pregnant pretrial detainee
told the county jail upon her admittance to the county that she was
pregnant and experiencing troubling symptoms.71 Despite being alerted
to her medical condition, jailers ignored her constant bleeding, her passage of blood clots, her cramping, and her requests for a physician.72
When she was finally transferred to a hospital, she gave birth in the
ambulance and lost her newborn son thirty-four minutes later.73 The
Eighth Circuit found that officials’ denial of her requests violated her
right to medical care.74
The Eighth Circuit, along with the Sixth Circuit, also found that
shackling pregnant women during labor violated their Eighth Amendment rights. In 2009, the Eighth Circuit heard Nelson v. Correctional
Medical Services,75 which involved a former pregnant inmate who was
shackled during labor.76 As a result of the restraints, Ms. Nelson suffers

67

Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 16.
69
Id.
70
849 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1988).
71
Id. at 1120.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1123; see also Pool v. Sebastian Cty., 418 F.3d 934, 944 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that
it would have been obvious to even a layperson that a pregnant prisoner complaining of bleeding
and extreme pain from cramping, which inhibited her ability to eat and shower, indicated that she
needed medical attention); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the nurse
on duty’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s history of premature deliveries and failure to examine the
plaintiff when she voiced her concerns showed the nurse’s deliberate indifference towards and
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s “serious medical need”).
75
583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009).
76
Id. at 526.
68
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chronic pain in her now-deformed hips, which, according to her orthopedist, refuse to go “back into the place where they need to be.”77 She
can no longer play with her children, do anything athletic, sleep or lean
on her left side, sit or stand for more than a short period of time, or have
children.78 She was a non-violent offender, imprisoned for writing bad
checks.79 The Eighth Circuit ultimately denied summary judgment for
the defendant-officer, stating that shackling a pregnant inmate during
childbirth has clearly been established as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.80 The Sixth Circuit in Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Davidson County81 also found that shackling pregnant detainees in labor substantially endangers the expectant mother’s health and
“offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’’’82
2.

D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ have found that inadequate medical
care and shackling do not meet the deliberate indifference
standard

Unlike the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, the D.C. and Ninth
Circuits have concluded that inadequate medical care and shackling do
not meet the deliberate indifference standard and, thus, do not violate
detainees’ Eighth Amendment rights. In Women Prisoners of D.C. v.
District of Columbia,83 female prisoners sued the District of Columbia
for violating their Eighth Amendment rights by providing them with
inadequate medical care, shackling them, and sexually abusing them.84
The trial court had ruled in favor of the female inmates, but the D.C.
Circuit reversed it. It rejected the provision in the district court’s order
requiring that prisons have written protocols regarding prenatal care,
reasoning that the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction.85 It
also rejected the district court’s order to hire a midwife to aid prisoners,
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Id.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 533. See also Brawley v. State of Wash., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (W.D. Wash.
2010) (denying summary judgment because shackling a prisoner in labor has clearly been established as an Eighth Amendment violation).
81
709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
82
Id. at 574. See also Villegas v. Davidson Cty., 789 F. Supp. 2d 895, 919 (M.D. Tenn. 2011)
(holding that shackling a pregnant detainee in the final stages of labor shortly before birth and
during the post-partum recovery and denying breast-pump post-partum infringes the Eighth
Amendment).
83
93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
84
Id. at 913.
85
Id. at 932, 944.
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to create a pre-natal clinic, and to provide for obstetrical examinations
inside the detention facilities.86 The D.C. Circuit also refused to declare
the use of restraints on pregnant detainees unconstitutional and rejected the district court’s standard.87 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that
courts have no experience running prisons, and, thus, they should defer
to prison officials’ judgments.88
As recently as 2016, the Ninth Circuit has held that lack of prenatal necessities and shackling does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights.89 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio90 held that the following did not violate the Eighth
Amendment: the county’s use of restraints on the prisoner during labor
and postpartum recovery after a caesarian section, its failure to provide
her with a breast pump, and its nutrition policy for pregnant inmates,
even though the prisoner reports of being repeatedly hungry and having
to drink water from the sink by her toilet.91
B.

Kingsley v. Hendrickson: A Different Standard for Pretrial Detainees?

Despite courts commonly including the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference requirement in cases involving pretrial detainees, the
Court recently expressed disagreement with this extension of the
amendment. In particular, it rejected the idea that there is one deliberate indifference standard that should be applied to all § 1983 claims
regardless of whether they are brought by convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees.
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson,92 a pretrial detainee brought an excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He alleged that officers, who had repeatedly asked him to
remove the paper covering the light in his cell, used excessive force by
handcuffing him, placing a knee in his back, slamming his head on concrete, and using a Taser on him.93
The Court found that confinement conditions of a non-convicted detainee violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if they (1) impose
some harm to [her] that either significantly exceed or are independent
of the inherent discomforts of confinement and (2) are not reasonably
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 923.
Id. at 931–32.
Id.
See generally Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1239, 1243.
135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
Id. at 2470.
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related to a legitimate government objective or are excessive in relation
to the legitimate governmental objective.94 Courts then must objectively
assess if there is a reasonable relationship between the government’s
conduct and a legitimate purpose.95 Thus, the Court held that the detainee only needed to prove that the defendant’s conduct, used purposely or knowingly against her, was objectively unreasonable, not that
the defendant subjectively knew that the amount of force used was unreasonable or excessive.96
The Court concluded the objective standard was the appropriate
standard given its precedent. The Court has held that “pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less
‘maliciously and sadistically.’”97 It also has held that “the Due Process
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that
amounts to punishment,”98 which can include actions “taken with an
‘expressed intent to punish.’”99 However, Bell further explained that if
pretrial detainees cannot show an express intent to punish, they can
still win their case by demonstrating that the defendants’ acts or omissions are not “rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation to that
purpose.”100
Kingsley, though, did not address whether its objective standard
applies to only excessive-force claims or to all Fourteenth-Amendment
claims made by pretrial detainees. Courts have since debated this question. Thus far, the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits have expressly
found that the objective standard set forth in Kingsley applies to pretrial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims while the Eighth,
Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits have declined to make such an extension.
1.

The Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits’ extension of the
Kingsley objective standard

The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to review Kingsley.
In Castro v. County of Los Angeles,101 a pretrial detainee banged on his
cell’s window to alert jail officials that the inmate placed in the same

94

Id. at 2473–74.
Id. at 2469.
96
Id. at 2472–73.
97
Id. at 2475 (internal citations omitted).
98
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
99
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
100
Id. at 561.
101
Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831
(2017).
95
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cell was combative and would likely harm him.102 Officials ignored him,
though, and his cellmate ultimately beat and severely injured him.103
He brought a § 1983 action, alleging violations of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to be protected from the harm inflicted by other inmates.104
The Ninth Circuit held that the objective standard of Kingsley was
not limited to excessive-force claims, extending it to pretrial detainees’
Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims.105 It reasoned that
the federal right and injuries suffered are the same for excessive force
and failure-to-protect claims.106 It also recognized that both claims arise
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, especially given pretrial detainees’ different status than convicted prisoners.107 In addition, it observed that the Court in Kingsley did not confine
its holding to “force” but rather stated that a pretrial detainee need only
provide objective evidence that “the challenged governmental action” is
unreasonably related to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in
relation to its objective.108 Using an objective inquiry to evaluate liability under § 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of
the detainee.109 It found sufficient evidence that the officers and the
County knew their actions and policies posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee but were deliberately indifferent to that
risk.110
After the Castro decision, the Second Circuit also extended Kingsley, applying its holding to pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement
complaints under the Fourteenth Amendment.111 In so doing, the Second Circuit overruled its past decision in Caiozzo v. Koreman,112 which
used a subjective test when evaluating a medical-care claim, given that
the Court in Wilson113 found medical care to be a condition of confinement.114 By the next year, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit,

102

Id. at 1064.
Id.
104
Id. at 1060.
105
Id. at 1070–71.
106
Id. at 1069–70.
107
Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)).
108
Id. at 1070 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74).
109
Id. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit has since applied the Kingsley holding to a detainee’s medical-need claim. Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122–25 (9th Cir. 2018).
110
Id.
111
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2nd Cir. 2017).
112
581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009).
113
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
114
Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 66, 68, 70–72.
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551]

PATROLLING PREGNANT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES’ BODIES

565

used the Kingsley objective standard in a case involving a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.115 The Second Circuit
specifically asked “whether a ‘reasonable person’ would appreciate the
risk to which the detainee was subjected.”116
The Seventh Circuit most recently heard Miranda v. County of
Lake,117 concerning the death of a pretrial detainee, an Indian national,
due to severe dehydration at a county jail and her Estate’s claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for inadequate medical care.118 The Seventh Circuit held that only the objective unreasonableness standard of Kingsley applied to pretrial detainees’ medicalcare claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The Seventh
Circuit first reasoned that the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed
courts to recognize pretrial detainees’ different status as compared to
convicted prisoners’ status.120 Second, it noted that the Court has found
that the analysis under the Eighth Amendment is “not coextensive”
with that of the Due Process Clause given the different language and
nature of the claims.121 To the Seventh Circuit, the Court’s reasoning in
Kingsley did not indicate that its holding applied only to excessive-force
claims but rather that it included other claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.122 Thus, the district court improperly instructed
the jury on intent; a jury, based on the evidence that the jail doctors
knew Gomes was not eating or drinking, could have found that the defendants purposefully, knowingly, or with reckless disregard chose to
observe Gomes in jail rather than take her to a hospital.123
2.

The Fifth, Eleventh and Eighth Circuits’ refusal to extend the
Kingsley objective standard

The Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, have
held that Kingsley applies only to pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth
Amendment claims alleging excessive-force. Thus, they have limited
the case to its facts.

115

Bruno v. City of Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id.
117
900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018).
118
Id. at 335, 346.
119
Id. at 352.
120
Id. at 350, 352–53 (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)).
121
Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and Currie v. Chhabra, 728
F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[D]ifferent constitutional provisions, and thus different standards,
govern depending on the relationship between the state and the person in the state’s custody.”)).
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Id.
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Id. at 354.
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In Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional Facility,124 a pretrial
detainee was stabbed and stomped by two inmates.125 It took several
complaints by the detainee and his family about his safety and medical
condition for an officer to acknowledge his attack and take him to the
hospital, where he was diagnosed with multiple broken ribs and numerous puncture wounds to his head, face, and body.126 The plaintiff
brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the correctional facility provided
him with “inadequate security and impermissibly delayed [his] medical
care.”127 The Fifth Circuit found that court precedent applied the subjective standard in cases decided after Kingsley; thus, the circuit’s rule
of orderliness mandated that they continue to do so.128 The Fifth Circuit
next asserted that, at the time, only the Ninth Circuit had extended the
objective standard of Kingsley.129 Finally, it concluded that, even if
Kingsley mandated the adoption of the objective standard for failure-toprotect claims, the plaintiff did not make such a claim.130 Thus, under
the subjective standard, the Fifth Circuit found that the detainee did
not sufficiently demonstrate that officials acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee when they
incorrectly housed him with department of correction inmates, though
there was some evidence that the officer acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.131
In Nam Dang, by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole
County,132 the Eleventh Circuit heard a case in which a pretrial detainee developed meningitis in jail, which resulted in him having
strokes that permanently injured him.133 The plaintiff alleged that he
received constitutionally deficient medical care due to deliberate indifference.134 He further argued that he need not show deliberate difference due to Kingsley.135 The Eleventh Circuit, though, held there was
no need to decide whether the objective standard applied.136 Kingsley
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848 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 418.
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Id.
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Id. at 415.
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Id. at 419 n.4 (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Estate
of Henson v. Wichita Cty., 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4.
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Id. at 420–21.
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Id. at 1276–78.
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only involved an excessive force claim.137 Moreover, the decision would
not help the detainee even if it could be applied because the Court noted
that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.”138 And, to the Fifth Circuit, the
jail nurse’s failure to treat Dang’s symptoms and her misdiagnosis was,
at most, negligence.139
The Eighth Circuit in Whitney v. City of St. Louis140 stated that
Kingsley did not apply because the detainee brought a deliberate indifference case rather than excessive force case.141 Under the subjective
standard, then, the Eighth Circuit found that the father of a pretrial
detainee who hanged himself in a jail cell did not sufficiently allege that
the officer knew of the detainee’s suicidal thoughts or that the municipal policy was deliberately indifferent.142
Therefore, while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits refuse to
read Kingsley as applying to claims other than excessive-force, the
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits apply Kingsley’s objective standard to other Fourteenth Amendment claims. Given the FourteenthAmendment claims likely to be brought by pregnant detainees in light
of the mistreatment and inadequate medical attention in detention centers, courts will have to decide which of the circuits to follow.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RIGHTS TO DIGNITY AND TO BE FREE
FROM CRUEL, INHUMANE PUNISHMENT
International law has also addressed the treatment of prisoners.
Most notably, international law bars cruel and inhumane punishment
through various treaties and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions. Specifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),143 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the
American Convention on Human Rights (“American Convention”), and
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) all state that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”144
The CAT defines torture as:
137

Id.
Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)) (emphasis in original).
139
Dang, 871 F.3d at 1276–78, 1279 n.2.
140
887 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2018).
141
Id. at 860 n.4.
142
Id. at 857.
143
The U.S. is a signatory to the UDHR.
144
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
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[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.145
The CAT also bars “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I,
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.”146 The CAT, ratified by the United States in 1994,
mandates that all State Parties “shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.”147
The ICCPR, which the United States signed in 1977 and ratified in
1992, further requires that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
the human person.”148 The American Convention, signed by the United
States, similarly mandates that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”149
The United Nations has also developed rules prohibiting shackling
specifically.150 For example, Rule 24 of the United Nations Rules for the
Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for
Women Offenders, otherwise known as the Bangkok Rules, expressly
states that “instruments of restraint shall never be used on women during labour, during birth and immediately after birth.”151 The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, otherwise known as the Mandela Rules, bars the use of restraints as punishment, though it does acknowledge their use for clear, narrow exceptions.152
145

U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
146
Id. at art. 16(1).
147
Id. at art. 2(1).
148
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 144, at art. 10.
149
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 144, at art. 5(2).
150
These rules are included in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. They are not
signed and ratified by each individual Member State but rather are adopted by the General Assembly, which consists of one representative from each Member State. For more information, see
General Assembly of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS (2018), http://www.un.org/en/ga/ [https:/
/perma.cc/57DC-NRL8].
151
G.A. Res. 65/229, ¶ 24 (Dec. 21, 2010) (emphasis added).
152
G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Dec. 17,
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Since the inception of these treaties, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee has clarified their meaning. For example, it found
the goal of Article 7 of the ICCPR, expressing freedom from torture or
inhumane treatment, was to “protect both the dignity and the physical
and mental integrity of the individual.”153
The United Nations Human Rights Committee further examined
Article 7 in Mellet v. Ireland.154 The Committee found that Ireland, by
prohibiting and criminalizing abortion and preventing Mellet from accessing medical care, subjected a highly vulnerable pregnant woman to
severe physical and mental suffering.155 The committee pointed out that
her anguish could have been avoided if the state had given her proper
health care.156 As a result, the state violated, among other rights, her
right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 7 of the ICCPR.157 The Committee noted that the fact that an act
is legal under domestic law does not stop it from violating Article 7; the
article is absolute and without exception, thus leaving no room for any
excuses.158
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, along with the
United Nations Committee Against Torture and United Nations Special
Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence against Women, have also advocated for all States to stop using restraints on women during their
pregnancy and while they are recovering thereafter.159 For example, the
Committee against Torture expressed concern about the United States’
treatment of female detainees, especially its shackling women detainees during labor and use of “gender-based humiliation,” and requested

2015).
153

U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20, Article 7, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/Gen/1/Rev.1 (1994), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom20.htm [https://perma.c
c/362H-PUFT].
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2013 (2016).
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Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and the Shackling
of Pregnant Women at 2 (2001); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the
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Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes, and Consequences: Ms. Rashida Manjoo: Mission to the United States of America, ¶ C(h), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17
/26/Add.5 (Jun. 6, 2011).
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that the State adopt the necessary policies to bring it back into “conformity with international standards.”160
IV. COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE NINTH, SECOND, AND SEVENTH
CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATION OF KINGSLEY
In light of the mistreatment of pregnant immigrant detainees,
which has been exacerbated due to the new ICE directive allowing for
the detainment of pregnant women in their first and second trimesters,
pregnant immigrant detainees will most likely bring more § 1983
claims, alleging inadequate conditions of confinement and delayed medical care due to deliberate indifference. When faced with these claims,
courts should mirror the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits by applying the objective standard set forth in Kingsley to all Fourteenth
Amendment claims brought by pretrial detainees, such as failure-toprotect and serious medical needs claims.
First, such a standard acknowledges the different protections that
pretrial detainees are afforded. Indeed, the Court has held time and
again that pretrial detainees have not been charged with anything and
thus cannot be punished.161 Immigrant detainees, such as pregnant
women held in detention centers, might be held to an even higher standard than pretrial criminal detainees.162 Thus, courts around the country
should use a standard that does not make it harder for pretrial detainees to receive the protections that the Court has already held they are
due. Rather, it should be enough that a reasonable person could find
that the conditions or lack of adequate medical care non-convicted person was unreasonable.163
In addition, the objective standard might better adhere to constitutional standards given that it does not engage in the subjective deliberate indifference standard of an Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed,
160

U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against
Torture: United States of America, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006).
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See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979).
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See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). Although they have not come to
an official consensus, courts have repeatedly held that immigration detainees are afforded at least
the same due process protections as pretrial criminal detainees. See Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d
772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000); Dahlan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007).
But see Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004). For more information, see Tom
Jawetz, Litigating Immigration Detention Conditions, ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT (2008),
https://law.ucdavis.edu/alumni/alumni-events/files/mcle-files/jawetz_detention_conditions.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/VTY4-TWB2].
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See Kyla Magun, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Potential Impact of
Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059, 2085 n.169 (2016)
(quoting Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 571 (2008) (“A showing of objective deliberate indifference, combined
with some showing of more than de minimis injury, shocks the conscience and thus should sustain
a substantive due process claim.”)).
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the Court has repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment analysis
is not the same as the Due Process Clause analysis; they differ in language and in the nature of their claims.164 Thus, the objective standard
could veer courts away from intertwining the analyses of the Eighth
Amendment and Due Process Clause, which in some courts has proved
detrimental to detainees’ cases.165
The Kingsley decision is also broadly worded. As the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, Kingsley’s holding is not limited to “force.”166 Instead, the
Court asserted that pretrial detainees need only provide objective evidence that “the challenged governmental action” is unreasonably related to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in relation to its
objective.167 Thus, this wording indicates that the Court meant for its
holding to apply to all Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by detainees. This especially makes sense in light of the fact that the injuries,
both physical and constitutional, suffered in excessive force claims and
other Fourteenth Amendment claims are the same.168
Furthermore, evidence exists that another circuit might join the
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit interpretation of Kingsley—the
Sixth Circuit. Despite both parties’ failure to raise arguments concerning Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit in Richmond v. Huq169 acknowledged the
change in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference jurisprudence that “calls into serious doubt” whether detainees such as the
plaintiff are required to demonstrate defendants’ subjective awareness,
and wanton disregard, of detainees’ serious medical conditions.170 This
reading of Kingsley mirrors the objective, reasonable person standard
set forth in the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits and, thus, shows
that the Sixth Circuit is inclined to follow their lead.
The Fifth Circuit might also include proponents of the Kingsley objective standard. Although Judge Graves in Alderson concurred in part,
he encouraged the Fifth Circuit to reevaluate applying the subjective
standard to pretrial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims
given the Kingsley holding.171
164

Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and to Currie v. Chhabra,
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Counter-Arguments to Emulating the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits

Critics might argue that Fourth Circuit offers support to the
Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Duff v. Potter172 still examined a detainee’s
inadequate medical treatment claim under the deliberate indifference
standard while analyzing his excessive-force claim under the objective
reasonableness standard. But the Fourth Circuit, unlike the Sixth Circuit, did not expressly contemplate the application of Kingsley to other
Fourteenth Amendment claims of pretrial detainees. Moreover, after
Kingsley, the Seventh Circuit still applied the deliberate indifference
standard under the Eighth Amendment to inadequate medical care
claims before joining the Ninth and Second Circuits with its holding in
Miranda v. County of Lake, which leaves it open for the Fourth Circuit
to follow the same path.173 Therefore, it is hard to say that the Fourth
Circuit supports the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ holdings.
In addition, supporters of the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits
might contend that the application of Kingsley to claims other than
those of excessive force is in conflict with the Court’s decision in Daniels
v. Williams.174 In that case, the Court overruled Parratt v. Taylor175 in
part and concluded that negligent conduct does not offend the Due Process Clause.176 Opponents of the objective-reasonableness standard
might be concerned that Kingsley’s objective-reasonableness standard
will allow negligence to be sufficient for liability and, thus, will conflict
with Daniels by constitutionalizing medical malpractice claims.
Kingsley, though, does not hold that negligence suffices for liability.
Rather it stated that courts must consider two separate state-of-mind
questions. First, they must inquire into the defendant’s state of mind
concerning his physical actions—“i.e., his state of mind with respect to
the bringing about of certain physical consequences in the world.”177
Then they must determine the defendant’s state of mind “with respect
to whether this use of force was ‘excessive,’” using an objective standard
and thus ensuring the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a
plaintiff has to prove.178 Unlike the second objective inquiry, then, the
J., specially concurring in part).
172
665 F. App’x 242, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2016).
173
See, e.g., Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n.31 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31. See Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016)
(en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 831 (2017).
177
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first question asks courts to decipher whether defendants have acted
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when they thought about the consequences of their actions concerning the pretrial detainee.179 The
Ninth Circuit and other courts of appeals, upon hearing detainees’
claims, have acknowledged that Kingsley requires a detainee to “prove
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin
to reckless disregard.”180
B.

The Effect of the Objective Standard on Pregnant Immigrant Detainees

In addition to adopting Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit precedent, courts should also interpret Kingsley to apply the objective standard to all Fourteenth Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees
because it will likely allow pregnant immigrant detainees to be more
successful in their serious medical need, failure-to-protect, and conditions of confinement claims. Rather than show actual knowledge, pregnant immigrant detainees would only have to show that, under the circumstances, detention officials and staff should have known they
needed medical attention. It seems that this standard would prove
fruitful in pregnant immigrant detainees’ cases given that most, if not
all, claim that at least one official was alerted to their condition, their
discomfort, or their bleeding and did nothing to alleviate it.181
In fact, under the Kingsley holding, courts could find that the inhumane treatment of pregnant detainees violates their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, these practices of endangering women’s
health exceeds and is independent of the inherent discomforts of confinement.182 It does not serve a legitimate penological purpose to allow
a pregnant woman to miscarry in a jail cell or to provide such poor conditions that she develops depression.183 In addition, precautionary
measures such as shackling might be related to an often-upheld governmental interest in ensuring safety but ultimately are excessive, especially given that a guard accompanies a detainee everywhere outside
her cell, including the delivery room.184

179

See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018).
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It will also likely be easier for a detainee to hold officials accountable under the objective deliberate indifference standard given the decisions of the circuit split. Whereas every circuit that heard cases using
the objective standard rendered judgment in favor of detainees, the
other circuit courts, i.e. the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth, did not despite
officials knowing about detainees’ injuries or illnesses and failing or delaying to give them the treatment they are afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment.185
Immigrant detainees in particular have already had some success
in gaining judgments in their favor. For example, the Ninth Circuit,
using the objective deliberate indifference standard, upheld a district
court’s order to provide clean bedding, personal hygiene accommodations, and medical screenings as well as monitor compliance and ensure
implementation.186
The objective standard would not only provide a more favorable
standard for pretrial detainees, but it could also change current policies
concerning pregnant detainees. As will be discussed in Section VI below, Congress has left some loopholes in its current and pending legislation that allows for detention officials and medical staff to exercise
their discretion when making decisions regarding pregnant detainees’
medical treatment or shackling.187 This discretionary standard has rendered its laws null and void because staff and officials often abuse the
standard and have continued to mistreat and shackle pregnant inmates.188 If courts use the objective standard when evaluating pretrial
detainees’ claims, they could not only discontinue the deference given
to detention officials189 but also signal to Congress and state legislatures that making allowances for officials’ discretion is no longer viable.
Detention staff also might refrain from mistreatment or act with more
diligence, knowing that the court will look at their actions from the perspective of a reasonable person rather than simply looking at their version of events.
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V. COURTS SHOULD USE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THEIR ADOPTION OF THE OBJECTIVE
STANDARD
Given the current circuit split, courts should refer to international
law as persuasive authority.190 Upon reviewing international law, they
will find that ICE policies and practices violate pregnant detainees’
rights to freedom from cruel, inhuman treatment, to dignity, and to be
treated with humanity. Given this clear contravention of the ICCPR,
the CAT, the American Convention, the UDHR, the Bangkok Rules, and
the Mandela Rules, courts might be more persuaded to follow the examples of the Seventh, Ninth, and Second Circuits and extend the
Kingsley decision given that they are more consistent with the international law approach.
As aforementioned, the ICCPR, the CAT, the American Convention, and the UDHR prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.191 The treatment, especially officials’ inadequate attention
to pregnant detainees’ miscarriages, clearly violates this prohibition.
Indeed, like Mellet, detention officials have prevented or delayed highly
vulnerable pregnant women from receiving medical care and contributed to their mental and physical pain, which could have been avoided
if they had chosen to pay attention to detainees’ needs.192 Thus, similar
to Ireland, the United States has violated detainees’ right to freedom
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Furthermore, the pain and suffering that pregnant detainees have
reported193 falls within, at the very least, the CAT definition of “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.”194 Specifically, pregnant detainees
have suffered both physically, receiving gashes from shackles and enduring miscarriages due to lack of medical attention, and mentally, suffering from stress, anxiety, and depression brought on by detention centers’ conditions and re-traumatization.195 The anguish has also been
inflicted and acquiesced by officials given their refusal to acknowledge
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or their dismissal of women’s cries for help, profuse bleeding, and obvious need for medical treatment.
The continued shackling of pregnant detainees also violates the international prohibitions against torture and inhuman treatment, Rule
24 of the Bangkok Rules,196 and the Mandela Rules.197 Indeed, the U.S.
has not complied with treaties’ requirements that it implement domestic mechanisms to prevent such mistreatment.198 The UN Human
Rights Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, and the UN
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence Against Women199
have repeatedly denounced this inaction, asserting that the United
States has failed to uphold modern standards of decency.200
It is also apparent that detention centers have been violating pregnant detainees’ rights to dignity and to be treated with humanity under
the ICCPR and the American Convention.201 As the Eighth Circuit insinuated, it is quite obvious that a woman bleeding out in her cell is
indication that she needs medical attention.202 Yet detention officers
and medical staff continue to ignore women’s needs, such as when they
left E lying in a pool of her blood for eight days or when they fail to
inquire about detainees’ mental health, especially when their pregnancies are a result of rape.203 Anyone can observe that such mistreatment
of pregnant detainees does not afford them dignity and treats them as
less than human.
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Some critics might be skeptical about the role of international
in courts’ interpretation of the United States Constitution.205
However, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the international consensus on basic human rights and the value of foreign laws
when deciding the constitutionality of certain acts.206 For example, the
Court determined that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”207 This interpretation of standards came from reviewing
the laws and universal belief of “civilized people” and the “civilized nations of the world.”208 Estelle further elaborated on “contemporary
standards” of decency by asserting that the infliction of unnecessary
suffering was inconsistent with them.209
Reviewing international law, then, should sway courts to extend
the objective standard to claims beyond excessive-force. Indeed, international law does not review the official actor’s intent but rather has
law204
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made blanket prohibitions on mistreatment, inadequate medical care,
and shackling of detainees and prisoners. Thus, courts should be persuaded that extending the objective standard would uphold international law and modern global standards of decency.
VI. CURRENT AND PENDING U.S. LEGISLATION DOES NOT APPLY TO OR
PROPERLY PROTECT PREGNANT DETAINEES
Critics could argue that the First Step Act,210 signed into law on
December 21, 2018 by President Trump, bars shackling of pregnant
women in addition to other significant criminal justice reforms.211 Thus,
the Comment’s aforementioned arguments are unnecessary.
But this prohibition on the use of restraints applies to prisoners
who are pregnant or are recovering postpartum.212 For the purposes of
the new law, “prisoners” only include people “sentenced to a term of
imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal offense,
or a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), including a
person in a Bureau of Prisons Contracted Facility.”213 In theory, this
could extend to pregnant detainees given that ICE used five federal
prisons to house approximately 1,600 immigrant detainees through
temporary interagency agreements with the Bureau of Prisons.214 Indeed, such June 2018 agreements, needed to accommodate the overflow
of detainees in detention centers, are valid until June 2019.215 In practice, however, no immigrant detainees have been put in federal prisons
since November 2018.216 Using federal prisons to house detainees was
unprecedented and highly controversial given that most detainees were
asylum seekers yet were treated like criminals.217 Some attorneys have
expressed doubt that federal prisons will be employed again given that
using federal prisons to detain immigrants and asylum seekers violated
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their constitutional rights and that more facilities are now being built
on the southern border.218
Critics could also contend that recent legislation specifically bars
the mistreatment and shackling of detainees. The first is the twentyninth amendment of the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2019, which limits the use of restraints on detainees who are
pregnant or in post-partum recuperation.219 The second piece of legislation is Senator Patty Murray’s Senate Bill 3225, or the Stop Shackling
and Detaining Pregnant Women Act, introduced on July 17, 2018.220
The Act purports to “ensure the humane treatment of pregnant women
by reinstating the presumption of release and prohibiting shackling, restraining, and other inhumane treatment of pregnant detainees.”221 The
bill, as of January 4, 2019, has made no movement within the Senate
since its introduction.222
Despite the well-intentioned provisions of the amendment, the
First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act, the legislation, if passed,
will not protect pregnant women due to some very large loopholes: they
allow for the detainment and shackling of women in “extraordinary circumstances.”223 An appropriate official may individually determine that
a pregnant detainee is a “serious flight risk” or “poses an immediate
and serious threat to herself or others” and “cannot be prevented by
other means.”224 A medical or healthcare professional also has the authority to request that pregnant women be restrained in the interest of
women’s medical safety.225 These officials are to use the least restrictive
restraints possible and may not use shackles during labor.226
While it may seem that this serves a compelling governmental interest, i.e. protecting others and the detainee from herself, it ends up
harming pregnant detainees in practice. Indeed, despite past and current legislation, the discretion allotted to detention officers has allowed
for the continuation of mistreatment and shackling of pregnant detainees, including during labor.227 The “least restrictive means” constraint
218
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is ineffective given how easily officers circumvent, and thus abuse, the
requirement; they can simply cite to their determination that the shackling was necessary.228 Detention staff also often lack proper education
about the law and, thus, believe their mistreatment is not illegal.229 Detention officers and medical professionals’ broad discretion and lack of
education are compounded by the lack of oversight. The Trump administration’s ICE directive disabled the reporting mechanisms that allowed outside organizations to supervise ICE’s detention officers, thus
ensuring that officials are not held accountable for unreasonable determinations.230 Therefore, the exceptions essentially nullify the prohibition.
Furthermore, the use of the extraordinary circumstances provision
is unjustified given that, thus far, lack of restraints on pregnant women
has not jeopardized anyone’s safety. Pregnant detainees in civil detention have not been convicted of any crimes, or most notably, any violent
crimes.231 Rather they are usually seeking asylum due to violence in
their home countries.232 None of the states where shackling pregnant
inmates is barred have reported that women in labor have escaped or
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harmed themselves, the public, medical staff, or correctional officers.233
Armed officers also usually guard shackled women, staying in or around
their delivery room, which many argue is adequate to protect all—doctors, nurses, the mother, and the newborn—involved.234 Finally, women
giving birth are in no condition to flee or strike out in violence.
Given the ongoing abuses, detention, and lack of education and oversight, many organizations and individuals who work with and advocate for pregnant detainees doubt that the legislation will actually
change officials’ behavior, finding the acts to be unsustainable.235 To
create long-term change, lawmakers must work on mechanisms to educate detention officers, enforce these measures, and allow for thirdparty supervision. Without such measures, legislation like the amendment, the First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act will continue to be
ignored and, thus, rendered meaningless.
CONCLUSION
In light of the harsh policy the Trump administration had adopted,
it will ultimately be up to the courts to ensure that pregnant immigrant
detainees are treated humanely and with dignity. They can take a step
towards ensuring this by following the example of the Ninth, Second,
and Seventh Circuits and interpreting Kingsley to extend to Fourteenth
Amendment claims other than excessive force. This determination is
supported by precedent that bars the punishment of pretrial detainees
and calls for scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth
Amendment. Furthermore, using international law as persuasive authority should convince courts to favor the Ninth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley given that the mistreatment of pregnant detainees is outlawed by several binding treaties, such as the
ICCPR and the CAT, which view these human rights violations objectively, not subjectively.
If courts follow this interpretation of Kingsley, it will likely have a
positive impact on pregnant detainees, making them more likely to
have successful outcomes when bringing § 1983 claims and holding detention officials more accountable for their disregard for pregnant detainees’ rights. Moreover, it could alter current policies and legislation
by signaling to Congress that it must close the gaps that allow for deference to detention centers and its officers who abuse their discretion.
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With these actions, the United States will be closer to ensuring that
another pregnant immigrant detainee does not say #MeToo.

